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NOTES
FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON THE USE OF TAXES
TO SUBSIDIZE SELECTIVELY THE MEDIA
INTRODUCTION

Taxation and the First Amendment usually involve separate
legal questions. Of course, every tax potentially impacts upon
speech, insofar as each dollar the government takes from an individual taxpayer leaves less for that taxpayer to use towards speech activities, such as purchasing a newspaper, going to the theater, or
writing to a local representative. When the press is the direct subject of the tax, First Amendment implications may not be readily
apparent, particularly to tax collectors and judges.
However, starting with the 1983 decision of Minneapolis Star v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,l the Supreme Court began emphasizing that state taxation schemes must treat the institutional press
with care. Minneapolis Star prohibited taxes directed solely at the
press or small groups within the press. 2 Subsequent state court decisions interpreted this holding to invalidate virtually any tax that established less than absolute equality among members of the press,
including the broadcast media.3 As a result, scores of state tax laws
that privileged certain sectors of the press fell under judicial scrutiny at a time when states were scrambling to find new sources of
4
revenue.
The recent case of Leathers v. Medlock 5 settled many of these
problems and significantly reduced the scope of the Minneapolis Star
decision. After Medlock, only those differential taxes that pose a significant danger of censorial abuse warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. 6 Medlock raises two recurring issues in First Amendment
analysis. First, because the tax at issue favored the traditional print
1

460 U.S. 575 (1983).

2
3
4

See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
Most states have tax structures that impact upon the media differentially in some

way; for example, through a newspaper exception to a sales tax, through a tax on advertising sales, or through a manufacturing exemption which is granted to one medium
(e.g., newspapers) but not others (e.g., broadcasting). See Todd F. Simon, All the News
That's Fit to Tax: FirstAmendment Limitations on State and Local Taxation of the Press, 21 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 59, 87-88 (1985).
5
111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
6 Id. at 1447; see infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
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media at the expense of cable television, 7 an analysis of Medlock
must consider the problems of intermedia discrimination and the
First Amendment status of the broadcast media, as well as whether
the Press Clause grants special protections to either broadcast or
print media. Second, Medlock raises the problem of the government
participanting in the marketplace of ideas, not as a censor, but
rather as an advocate, thus using its power to subsidize certain
speech or speakers to the exclusion of others.

This Note considers the remaining limits on the differential taxation of the media after Medlock. Part I surveys the history of taxation of the media prior to Medlock, including basic principles of
taxation as they affect free speech in general. Part II examines
Medlock and considers how it addresses some of the problems posed
by taxation of the media. Part III describes some of the inadequacies of the Medlock test, particularly its failure to consider that a differential tax may still have a detrimental effect on access to the
unique content of cable television, regardless of any possible legislative censorial motive. This Note concludes that the usual deference
accorded tax statutes is not appropriate where differential taxation
distorts the media market, and that the Medlock Court failed to appreciate fully the power of differential taxes to infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of the media.
I
BACKGROUND

A. Constitutional Origins and the Press Clause
Judicial review of taxation has a mixed history. On the one
hand, opposition to unfair taxation played a central role in the
American Revolution. 8 Evidence indicates that the Framers were
gravely concerned about differential taxation of the press. 9 The
Press Clause was a reaction to the colonists' experiences with cen7 Cable systems receive television or radio signals through antennae, process and
feed the signals into a distribution network consisting of cables strung along utility poles
or in underground pipes, and carry the signals to subscribers. They are thus primarily
systems of distribution, but particularly significant ones because they provide a far
greater number of channels and consequently greater diversity of programming than
conventional commercial television. See DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION
AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 1.03 (1989).
8
See PHILIP DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1783
226 (1941); MARC EGNAL, A MIGHTY EMPIRE: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (1988); EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PRO-

LOGUE TO REVOLUTION 292-96 (1953).
9 See 3 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 65, 81-82 (1981).

Alexander Hamilton noted and attempted to refute this argument for press protection
from taxation through the Bill of Rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 477 n.80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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sorship at the hands of the British monarch.' 0 In addition, a crucial
early Supreme Court decision in the establishment of federal govemnment powers, McCulloch v. Maryland, developed federal immunity

to state taxation and declared that "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy.""

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has long been reluctant
to subject tax classifications to rigorous review, reflecting both govemnment's vital need to secure revenues and the relatively disfavored status of property right claims usually involved in tax
challenges. 12 Prior to Grosjean v. American Press Co.,' 3 cases concerning taxation and freedom of the press were rare and treated summa10 The Framers reacted to history and experience with the British government's use
of taxes to control the press and to make access more difficult for the masses. Among
the most effective means used by the British to restrict the press was the Stamp Tax,
much hated by American publishers and revolutionaries alike. See EDWIN EMERY, THE
PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 15 (1972); LEONARD
W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUP-

123-24 (1963); FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND,
1476-1776 322 (1965); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 455 (1983).
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
12 See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) ("Where
taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in
their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation."); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) ("The State may impose different specific taxes upon
different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products.
It is not required to resort to close distinction or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value."); see also Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88
(1940); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs v.Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930);
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563 (1910). But see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Webster County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
Disparate state classifications frequently reflect an aim to regulate or support certain industries or products. In fact, the Court has in the past recognized, and deferred
to, the regulatory purpose behind a system of taxation. See United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) ("[A] tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed."); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. 533 (1869) (federal tax designed to drive state bank notes out of circulation); cf
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (federal tax on manufacturers who
knowingly employ child labor held unconstitutional as a regulation beyond the federal
government's commerce power). Such economic regulations are now subject to highly
deferential equal protection review. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce are a notable exception to this
usual rule of federal court deference. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483
U.S. 266 (1987); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation and
the Supreme Court, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 223; Simon, supra note 4, at 84-86; Steven M.
Cohen, Note, A Tax on Advertising: First Amendment and Commerce Clause Implications, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 810 (1988).
13 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
PRESSION
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rily. In Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Publishing Co., 1 4 the Virginia
Supreme Court denied a challenge under the state constitution to a
municipal tax directed solely at the press. Preston v. Finley ' 5 upheld a
Texas occupation tax on newspapers with minimal discussion of the
state constitution's press clause. These early cases preceded incorporation of the First Amendment to cover the states, and therefore
6
relied only on interpretations of state constitutional guarantees.'
B.

Evolution of First Amendment Limits on Taxation
1. Grosjean v. American Press Co.

The first case under the Federal Constitution dealing with the
peculiar problem of taxing the press is Grosjean v. American Press Co. 17
Grosjean represents an example of a tax imposed by the legislature
with an intent to penalize a group of newspapers because of their
editorial content. In 1934, Louisiana imposed a license tax of two
percent on gross receipts from the sale of advertising in newspapers
with a weekly circulation in excess of 20,000.18 Only thirteen newspapers fit this description, twelve of which had sharply criticized the
powerful Senator Huey Long in a recent election.19 Although it did
not explicitly cite legislative censorial motive in striking down the
tax, the Court did note that:
[the tax here involved] is bad because, in the light of its history
and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of its constitutional
20
guaranties.
Many subsequent cases looked to this language, making Grosjean's
application dependent on a finding of legislative intent to censor
2
newspaper content. '
28 S.E. 959 (Va. Ct. App. 1898).
72 F. 850 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1896).
The incorporation doctrine can be traced to dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Among the first cases to apply explicitly First Amendment standards to
state conduct were Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
17 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
14

15
16

18

Id at 240.

19 Id at 238; see also Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 579-80 (1983).
20 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
21
The Supreme Court itself had been inconsistent as to whether malevolent legislative intent was decisive in Grosjean. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
384-85 (1968) (legislative intent irrelevant) with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 383 (1973) (legislative intent to censor
necessary). Minneapolis Star settled the question and declined to rely on Grosjean where a
legislative intent to penalize newspapers for content is lacking. 460 U.S. 575, 580
(1983).
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The Grosjean Court relied on two additional rationales in finding
the tax infirm under the First Amendment: it had a tendency to restrict circulation and it was targeted only at the press.2 2 The Court
strongly suggested that the states may subject the press to taxes of
general applicability: "It is not intended by anything we have said to
suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the
23
ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government."
2.

Subsequent State Court Cases

After Grosjean, some state court opinions also required that the
challenger of a tax on the press prove it to be a deliberate device to
censor or penalize the media. 24 Most courts, however, did not require a showing of malevolent motive and read Grosjean to limit
taxes of the press to those of general applicability. For example, the
Maryland Court of Appeals struck down a city ordinance taxing the
sale of advertising in newspapers, radio, television, and billboards.2 5
The court held that "the question of ulterior motive.., was [not],
alone, controlling in the Grosjean case." 26 A tax directed solely at
the press, the court claimed, violates the First Amendment regardless of the purity of the legislature's intent.2 7 Other courts used the
same rationale to uphold the application of general tax schemes to
the press.2 8 Plaintiffs also relied frequently on Grosjean in cases involving media other than newspapers 2 9 or concerning regulations
30
other than taxation.
22

Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244-45.
Id. at 250.
24
See, e.g., Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. 1937) (Lockwood, J., concurring); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 416 N.E.2d 191 (Mass.
1981).
25 Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111 (Md. 1958).
26 Id. at 119.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819 (Ariz. 1937) (general sales tax as applied to
newspapers); Tampa Times Co. v. Tampa, 29 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1947) (license tax directed
at newspapers but considered part of general tax system levied on businesses);
Steinbeck v. Gerosa, 151 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1958) (state gross receipts tax as applied to
income earned from the sale of an author's books). Over this period, the Supreme
Court also upheld numerous general regulations as applied to the press. See Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (the enforcement of subpoenas); Mabee v. White Plains
Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (the Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (the antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103 (1937) (the National Labor Relations Act).
29 See, e.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966) (holding total ban on pay
television transmissions unconstitutional under First Amendment).
30 See, e.g., Garcia v. Tully, 377 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. 1978) (denial of challenge to a state
law giving government discretion to choose which newspapers could publish tax assessment lists).
23
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IlI

Taxation and Individual Speech

In the period between Grosjean and Minneapolis Star, the
Supreme Court decided several important cases dealing with taxation and individual speech. In Speiser v. Randall,31 the Court found a
California law requiring a loyalty oath in order to receive a property
tax exemption unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The
case developed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: a state
may not condition benefits on the sacrifice of constitutional rights,
since such a condition has the same effect as if the state had directly
punished the person for engaging in the speech.3 2 The Court also
relied on the discriminatory content of the state's requirement, as it
was "'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.' "3 The next
year, in Cammarano v. United States,34 the Court sustained an Internal
Revenue Service regulation that denied a tax deduction for the lobbying expenses of businesses. The Court held that government
does not have any obligation to subsidize a citizen's speech activities. The case was distinguished from Speiser because Cammarano
was not denied an unrelated deduction due to a disfavored
viewpoint.
C.

The Minneapolis Star/Taxation With Representation Conflict
1. Minneapolis Star

In Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue 3 5 the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that a tax scheme violated the First
Amendment only if proven to have a censorial motive, stating that
"[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the
First Amendment."3 6 The state of Minnesota exempted newspapers
from its retail sales tax, but in 1971 the state legislature enacted a
special "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in
the production of a newspaper.3 7 Other businesses that used ink
and paper were not subject to this tax but did pay a general sales tax
on these items. Three years later, the state legislature amended the
38
use tax to exempt a publication's first $100,000 of ink and paper.
As a result, small newspapers did not pay the tax. In 1974, for example, only eleven publications incurred use tax liability. The Min357 U.S. 513 (1958).
I- at 518; see infra note 172 for more on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
33
Id. at 519 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,402
31
32

(1950)).
358 U.S. 498 (1959).

34
35

460 U.S. 575 (1983).

36
37
38

Id. at 592.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
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neapolis Star & Tribune Company accounted for roughly two-thirds
39
of the revenue raised by the tax.
Holding that the state could easily abuse the differential nature
of the use tax, the Court struck down the tax and asserted that the
40
tax presented newspapers with the constant threat of censorship.
The Court found the differential nature of the tax invidious in two
respects. First, the state levied a tax on the press that was not applicable to the business community at large. 4 ' Second, the state taxed
individual members of the same medium differently due to the
42
$100,000 exemption, thus targeting a small group of newspapers.
The Court concluded that such a disparate tax scheme
presented a situation ripe for abuse, giving the legislature leverage
to control and constrain the content of affected newspapers. In fact,
the mere differential structure of the use tax rendered it unconstitutional. 43 Viewing the courts as institutions "poorly equipped to
evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of
taxation,"' 44 the Court refused to consider whether the tax in effect
burdened the press more than other businesses. Consequently,
under Minneapolis Star, differential tax treatment of the press is presumptively invalid, requiring a state to present a compelling objective that necessitates such treatment. 4 5 The need to raise revenue,
39 Id.
40 Id. at 585.
41 Id. at 586.
42 Id. at 591. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the exemption did not create a differential burden because all newspapers benefited from the same $4000 credit
due to the exemption. Id. at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In effect, however, the tax
gave the state strong leverage over the large newspapers subject to the tax, especially
the Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company, which accounted for approximately twothirds of the total revenue derived from the use tax.
43
Both the dissent and commentators criticized the Court's finding of a First
Amendment violation without an actual intent or the effect of altering content. See
Simon, supra note 4, at 75-76. Justice Rehnquist termed it "unprecedented and unwarranted." 460 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Parallels, however, can be drawn to previous cases striking down vague statutes
which vested standardless discretion in government officials in permitting speech in a
public forum. In such cases, the Court strictly scrutinizes regulations that are contentneutral because of a fear of abuse and of a possible "chilling effect" on protected
speech. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938); cf Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (Court upheld state
licensing scheme for parades and marches but only after state court gave statute limiting
construction to remove discretion of licensing authorities).
44 460 U.S. at 589. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist showed no such reluctance to analyze the relative tax burdens. In fact, he concluded that the use tax benefited the press
by lowering its taxes relative to other businesses subject to the general sales tax. Id. at
598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Also, compare Minneapolis Star with Washington v.
United States, 460 U.S. 536 (1983), in which the Court willingly analyzed the effect of a
state tax and sustained it from challenge under the Supremacy Clause.
45 460 U.S. at 585.
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ordinarily sufficient to sustain any classification for tax purposes,
46
does not justify special treatment of the press.
2.

Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington

Two months after Minneapolis Star, the Supreme Court upheld a
scheme that employed differential taxation of individual speakers in
a context even more ripe for discrimination on the basis of content.
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington 4 7 [hereinafter
TWR], the Court upheld I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), which denies a
certain type of tax-exempt status to charitable organizations for
48
whom lobbying constitutes a substantial part of their activities.
Lobbying organizations may still achieve tax-exempt status under
section 501 (c) (4), but, unlike those under section 501 (c) (3), such organizations may not receive tax deductible charitable contributions.4 9 Crucial to the Court's analysis was the assumption that
TWR could reorganize in dual structure, with a section 501(c)(3)
organization conducting nonlobbying activities and a section
501 (c) (4) affiliate conducting lobbying activities. 50 Otherwise, TWR
would have been denied a benefit based on the exercise of a constitutional right, presumably contrary to the rule in Speiser.51 Tax deductible contributions could be directed to the section 501(c)(3)
organization as long as the section 501(c)(3) organization did not
subsidize the section 501(c)(4) affiliate. 52 The Internal Revenue
Code also created a discriminatory tax structure because, under section 170(c)(3), taxpayers could deduct contributions to veterans' organizations regardless of how much those organizations lobbied. 53
The Court first concluded that this differential tax treatment
did not infringe upon the respondent's First Amendment liberties.
Id. at 586.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
48
461 U.S. at 543.
49 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3) (1988) contains a general description of charitable organizations, and includes a ban on lobbying and participation in political campaigning. By
contrast, § 501(c)(4) only includes organizations "operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare," and does not limit lobbying. Both types of organizations are taxexempt, but any organization disqualified from § 501(c)(3) status by reason of lobbying
activities cannot receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. § 170(c). The Court
decided TWR under the assumption that a lobbying affiliate could readily qualify for
§ 501(c)(4) status. 461 U.S. at 544.
50 461 U.S. at 544.
51 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. For confirmation that inability to
form a dual structure would change the TWR result and lead to a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364 (1984) (striking down a federal law banning editorializing by public broadcasting
stations receiving federal funds).
52 461 U.S. at 544.
53
Id. at 546.
46

47
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It considered an exemption under section 501(c)(3) and the accompanying access to deductible contributions as, in effect, a government subsidy for speech activities. 5 4 Congress has virtually
complete discretion to choose which speech to subsidize, based on
content or any other factors. Whether government support comes
from a direct grant or a tax exemption is irrelevant. 5 5 The Court
also considered an equal protection challenge to the statute, but because it had already decided that the statute did not infringe on
56
speech rights, it applied only a rational basis standard of review.
Given the broad legislative discretion in creating tax classifications
and the legitimate goal of rewarding veterans for their service, the
57
differential tax structure easily satisfied this level of review.
Minneapolis Star and TWR are not easily reconciled. The second
prong of Minneapolis Star, barring differential taxation within a medium, is susceptible to a TWR analysis. That is, the tax exemption
benefiting small newspapers operated as a government subsidy.
Under the reasoning of TWR, the state did not infringe Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Company's First Amendment rights merely because
the company did not receive such a subsidy. In addition, while the
Minneapolis Star Court feared that such a differential tax structure
would present a significant risk of content-based abuse, the same
Court in TWR made it clear that a government is free to grant or
refuse subsidies on the basis of content.
Minneapolis Star might be reconciled with TWR in two ways.
First, Minneapolis Star may represent a case where the First Amendment affords special protections to the press. 58 Second, the structure and applicability of the tax in TWR may be distinguished from
that in Minneapolis Star.59 In part, Leathers v. Medlock may be viewed
as an attempt to reconcile these two cases based on the second
rationale.

Id. at 544-45.
Id. at 548-50. For more on subsidies and the First Amendment, see infra notes
172-92 and accompanying text.
56 Id. at 546-48.
57 Id. at 547-48, 550-51.
58 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983); see infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
59 The tax at issue in Minneapolis Star was inherently more dangerous because it
lacked general applicability and was directed at a small number of publications. By contrast, the I.R.C. provisions upheld in TWR applied to all nonveterans charitable organizations in the country. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
54
55
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D. Ragland and Subsequent State Court Approaches to
Differential Intermedia Taxation
The Court clarified the problematic second prong ofMinneapolis
Star in Arkansas Writers'Project,Inc. v. Ragland.60 Arkansas imposed a
tax on receipts from sales of tangible personal property but exempted newspapers and "'religious, professional, trade and sports
journals and/or publications printed and published within this State
• .. when sold through regular subscriptions.' "61 The appellant in
Ragland published a general interest magazine that did not qualify
for the magazine exemption. Not only did the tax discriminate
within a medium, as in Minneapolis Star, but it did so on the basis of
the magazine's contents. 62 The Court struck down the tax, finding
that it failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard that Minneapolis Star
required.
Because the Ragland Court decided the case based on the selective application of the tax to magazines, it declined to address
whether "a distinction between different types of periodicals
presents an additional basis for invalidating the sales tax."'6 3 Subsequent state court decisions, however, extended the Minneapolis
Star/Raglandrationale to intermedia tax discrimination. Such cases
defined the institutional press to include not only newspapers but
also magazines and broadcasters. These courts struck down any differential taxation within the press based on this definition.
64
In Oklahoma Broadcaster'sAssociation v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
for example, the court invalidated a state sales tax on advertising
revenue that applied to the broadcast media but exempted the print
media. A New York appellate court found unconstitutional the opposite situation-a state tax on advertising revenue from magazines
but not from broadcasters. 65 Finally, a Louisiana appellate court,
addressing the question that Ragland avoided, struck down a tax that
treated newspapers differently from magazines. 66 On the surface,
the invalidity of such intermedia discrimination seems the logical extension of Minneapolis Star and Ragland. After all, television and
magazines generally provide information services similar to newspapers. As the court in Oklahoma Broadcaster'sAss'n noted, "[t]he First
60
61

481 U.S. 221 (1987).
Id. at 224.

62 Id. at 229-30. The Arkansas tax also targeted only a small segment of the press,
because, at most, three magazines paid the tax. Id. at 229 n.4.
63
Id. at 233.
64
789 P.2d 1312 (Okla. 1990).
65 McGraw-Hill v. State Tax Comm'n, 541 N.Y.S.2d 252 (3d Dep't 1989), aft'd, 552
N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1990).
66 Louisiana Life, Ltd. v. McNamara, 504 So. 2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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Amendment guarantees freedom of the press-not just the printed
'6 7
press."
II
LEATHERS V. MEDLOCK

The Supreme Court finally faced the problem of intermedia differentiation in Leathers v. Medlock.68 As in Ragland, this case concerned Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act, which placed a 4% tax on
receipts from the sale of all tangible personal property and certain
services. 69 The statute expressly exempted subscription and overthe-counter newspaper sales as well as subscription magazine
sales. 70 Originally, the Court held that the statute did not cover
cable or satellite television services. In 1987, however, the Arkansas
legislature amended the Act to impose a sales tax on cable televi71
sion. The Act was applied to satellite television two years later.
Immediately after the Act was amended, a number of cable
companies and subscribers brought a class action suit in the Arkansas Chancery Court to challenge the constitutionality of extending
the sales tax to cable. The complaint was based on the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chancery Court upheld the Act based on cable's
necessary use of a public right-of-way. The Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected this decision because the cable companies already
paid a franchise fee for access to the right-of-way. 72 The Arkansas
court distinguished between differential intramedia taxation and differential intermedia taxation, and held only the former unconstitutional. 73 Defining cable and satellite television as part of the same
media, the court held that the tax was only unconstitutional under
the First Amendment for the period during which cable, but not satellite television, was subjected to the tax. 74 Both the cable companies and the Arkansas Commissioner of Revenue petitioned the
75
Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Court affirmed the Arkansas decision and reversed the
trend toward invalidating all differential intermedia taxation. 76 The
Court interpreted Minneapolis Star and Ragland as not questioning all
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

789 P.2d at 1316.
111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
Id. at 1441.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1447.
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differential taxation within the institutional media. Instead, the
Court held that these cases only require examination of those differential tax structures that suggest a strong probability of government
77
censorship.
Three factors dictate when differential taxation warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. First, relying on the first prong of Minneapolis
Star, the tax must be one of general applicability and may not target
the press as an institution separate from other businesses. 78 Second, under Ragland, the state must not draw a content-based distinction. 79 Finally, the targeted segment of the media should be large
enough so that intentional interference with its First Amendment
80
activities is unlikely.
The Medlock Court found little danger of censorship or other
curtailment of First Amendment liberties for two reasons. 8 1 First,
Arkansas subjected nearly 100 cable television companies to a generally applicable sales tax. Second, cable programming does not
differ systematically from the content of newspapers or magazines.
Based on these distinctions, the Court largely reconciled TWR
with Minneapolis Star. The tax in TWR subjected all nonveterans'
lobbying organizations to a generally applicable tax scheme, while
the Minnesota tax subjected a small number of large newspapers to
a special tax directed at the press. 82 In fact, the Medlock Court specifically relied on TWR for the proposition that a tax scheme discriminating among speakers does not infringe upon First
83
Amendment liberties unless it does so on the basis of content.
The Court concluded that "differential taxation of speakers, even
members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing,
particular ideas."'8 4 Thus, the Court concluded that the cable companies did not have a cognizable First Amendment claim, but remanded to the Arkansas Supreme Court for consideration of the
equal protection issue. 85 Unlike the Arkansas courts, the majority
did not term the problem as one of intermedia taxation, but as a tax
"that excludes or exempts certain segments of the media but not
others." 8 6 Presumably, the Court intends for its test to apply re77
79
80
81

Id. at
d
Id at
Id. at
Id. at

82

Id.

83
84

Id. at 1445.
Id. at 1447.

85

Id.

86

Id. at 1441.

78

1443.

1444.
1443-44.
1444-45.
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gardless of the intermedia context. Unfortunately, this approach ignores the significance of the state choosing to discriminate on the
basis of medium and the important content effects of this
87
discrimination.
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed
that Ragland had not answered the question of intermedia tax discrimination, but advocated an approach that would largely include
the Arkansas tax under the Minneapolis Star/Raglandtest. Marshall's
approach focused on the potential for impeding the free flow of
ideas and distorting "consumer preferences for particular information formats." 8 8 Thus, Marshall would concentrate on a tax statute
potential effect on content, regardless of possible legislative motive.
Because cable offers unique programming contributions, differential
taxation affects consumer access to that programming and creates a
potential for abuse under the Minneapolis Star framework.8 9 Marshall also criticized the majority's "small number of speakers test"
as vague in identifying what number will heighten the Court's scrutiny.90 He also believed the majority was misapplying the test facts
since cable operators do not function as a state-wide information
market, but rather hold local monopolies. 9 1
To summarize, the Medlock Court synthesized the facts of Minneapolis Star and Ragland, devising a three part test by which differential taxation of the media is judged. A court must apply strict
scrutiny if any one of three elements is present: the tax lacks general applicability; the tax is based on content; or the tax is targeted
at a small number of the media. 9 2 This test seeks to identify those
situations that the Court considers to present an intolerable threat
of state censorship. 93 Therefore, although the Court does not require proof of actual censorial intent, its analysis is only one step
removed from such a requirement. The test emphasizes the possibility of using taxes to control content and presumes bad intent
whenever one of the three factors is found. In this manner, the
87 Justice Marshall noted this point in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 1452. For the
Arkansas Supreme Court's emphasis on the difference between intermedia and intramedia tax discrimination in this case, see Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 204
(Ark. 1990).
88 Medlock, 1 II S. Ct. at 1450.
89 Id. at 1451.
90
Id.

9'

Id. at 1451-52.
Id. at 1443-44. For a recent case drawing on the second strand of Medlock, see
Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501 (1991) (striking down
New York's "Son of Sam" law, which required the surrender of income derived from a
wrongdoer's speech about a crime committed).
93 Medlock, I11 S. Ct. at 1447.
92
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Court has all but resurrected the Grosjean intent requirement, 94
while failing to consider the possibility of a differential tax infringing on the freedom of the press even when a motive of state censorship is unlikely.
III
DISCUSSION

A.

Medlock and Content Discrimination
1. Censorship and Content Discrimination

The Medlock test is well-adapted in preventing illicit legislative
intent, the primary concern of the MinneapolisStar Court.9 5 A generally applicable tax removes the state's potential leverage by assuring
that any change in the taxation of the medium must similarly affect
all other businesses subject to the tax. 96 Similarly, the larger and
more diverse the segment of media affected by the tax, the less likely
the legislature will be able to direct taxes at offending publications
or broadcasters. Consequently, concern with possible content discrimination and a refusal to subject the Arkansas tax to strict scrutiny underlie the Court's decision in Medlock.
Indeed, a government regulation stated in terms of content
97
normally requires the most exacting level of court scrutiny.
Facially neutral restraints on content expression usually require a
less stringent level of review, which is satisfied by a showing of reasonable or significant government interests. 98 The Minneapolis Star
line of cases is unique in subjecting content neutral statutes to strict
scrutiny based on the mere potential for content censorship.
2.

Subject Matter Discrimination

Within the area of content discrimination, a distinction has
been drawn between discrimination of viewpoint and discrimination
of subject matter.99 Viewpoint discrimination involves a govern94

See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.

95

460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).

96

This point illustrates the salutary nature of the equal protection guarantee, as

noted by Justice Jackson in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112

(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). In Medlock, it is actually the exempted newspapers and
magazines that are singled out for "special" treatment and thus still susceptible to legislative pressure.
97 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. States Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991); Arkansas Writers' 'Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
98 See ConsolidatedEdison Co. of N. Y., 447 U.S. at 536; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 190 (1983).
99 Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions,46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 88 (1978); see also ConsolidatedEdison Co. of

120

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78:106

ment regulation aimed at suppressing a particular position on a
given topic. Through subject matter discrimination, government
limits debate on an entire topic regardless of position. A subject
matter restraint can often serve as a convenient proxy for viewpoint
discrimination. For example, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 00
involved a statute barring all picketing near a school except labor
picketing. While the legislature drew a subject matter distinction, it
realized that only labor picketing would be by unions representing a
particular point of view. In Mosley, the Court stated that "above all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' 0 1 Similarly, the Court in Ragland found the
state's differential tax particularly invidious because it made a sub102
ject matter distinction.
Professor Stone criticizes this equation of subject matter with
viewpoint in the context of content discrimination by pointing to the
Court's inconsistent application.' 0 3 Stone argues that the Court applies heightened scrutiny to content-based restrictions because such
restrictions uniquely distort the "marketplace of ideas" and are
likely the product of illegitimate legislative motive. 10 4 According to
Stone, however, these factors basically only forcefully apply to viewpoint distinctions. In most cases, lower scrutiny will suffice to control subject matter discrimination. 10 5
N.Y., 447 U.S. at 545-46 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that many legitimate time,
manner, and place restrictions must be drafted in terms of subject matter, such as argument before a court or speech in a classroom); Laura V. Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland
(1990).

The Limits of Content DiscriminationAnalysis, 78 GEO. L.J. 1949

100

408 U.S. 92 (1972).

101

Id. at 95.

102

481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987).

103

Stone, supra note 99, at 88.

For examples of the Court's inconsistency, compare Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976) (upholding military base's policy of permitting civilian speakers to address military personnel on a variety of subjects, but not on the subject of partisan politics), Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974) (upholding city's policy of leasing
the advertising spaces of its transit vehicles for the display of commercial but not political messages) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding state statute
prohibiting the involvement of its public employees in political campaigns) with
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking down a city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theaters from displaying movies containing nudity) and Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating an ordinance that restricted picketing
near a school, but exempted labor picketing). In part, the Court's confusion can be
attributed to the convoluted nature of public forum analysis involved in many of these
cases, as well as interest in preventing overt government involvement in speech regarding partisan politics. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 305 (Douglas, J., concurring).
104
Stone, supra note 99, at 107.
105 Id. at 110.
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A tax that treats various media differently also raises a structural problem that impacts on the Court's rigorous scrutiny of all
overt content distinctions. The state legislature needs to define the
relevant media subject to such a tax. For example, the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Medlock chose to include cable and satellite televi10 6
sion in the same medium, but to exclude commercial television.
Under Ragland, a state may not base its determination on the content of the publications.10 7 Similarly, a distinction between newspapers and magazines based solely on physical properties, such as
print type, runs the risk of being irrational for any legitimate state
purpose.' 0 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court evaded a similar
problem of distinguishing between a newspaper and an advertising
circular by basing the distinction upon the percentage of the publication devoted to advertising. 10 9
The Court in Medlock does not clearly explain what type of content regulation generates concern. The Court notes that it will
stringently review differential taxation "when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints." ' t" 0 While
the Medlock Court incorporates Ragland's strict scrutiny for subject
matter restrictions, a concern over government censorship of objectionable and unpopular views underlies the Court's decision."' In
addition, although Minneapolis Star rejected an inquiry into legislative motive as the focal point of its analysis, its approach, in effect, is
designed to target an invidious legislative motive but not necessarily
a content distorting effect as well.
B.

First Amendment Equal Protection
1. Two-Tier Approach

The emphasis on content discrimination influenced the level of
scrutiny that the Court applied. The issue in Medlock was whether to
subject the differential tax to strict scrutiny. MinneapolisStar defined
this level of review as requiring an "interest of compelling importance that [the state] cannot achieve without differential taxation." 1 12 In Medlock, the Supreme Court rejected this First
Amendment challenge to the differential tax, but remanded the
equal protection claim for consideration by the state court. The decision leaves open the question of what remains for the state court
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987).
108
See Louisiana Life, Ltd. v. McNamara, 504 So. 2d 900, 906 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Farthing, supra note 99, at 1952.
109 In re Village Publishing Corp., 322 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. 1984).
110 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991).
I11 Id. at 1444.
112 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
106

107
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to review on remand. In fact, Medlock highlights the uneasy coexistence of equal protection and the First Amendment in differential
tax cases. A plaintiff can readily cast any content based discrimination as an equal protection claim.' 1 3 Mosley recognized the close relation between these two claims.' 14 Medlock further underscores this
relationship. Under an equal protection analysis, the first inquiry
assesses whether strict scrutiny is appropriate. The Court uses such
heightened scrutiny when the legislative classification burdens a suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental right. 1 15 Because freedom of expression (or the press) under the First Amendment
constitutes a fundamental right, any classification abridging speech
rights requires strict scrutiny. 16 This same inquiry is the focus of
an independent First Amendment claim. Any infringement on First
Amendment rights also leads to strict scrutiny." 1 7 Thus, as result of
determining that the Arkansas tax did not infringe upon the cable
companies' First Amendment rights, the Medlock Court decided not
to apply strict scrutiny as part of an equal protection analysis.
Even if the statute does not burden a fundamental right, the
classification at issue must still have a rational basis under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 18 Presumably, review for such a basis is the
purpose of the remand by the Medlock Court. In the context of its
First Amendment decision, however, the Court answered this question. First, all legislative determinations receive a presumption of
regularity."19 In addition, the Court stressed the broad latitude
given to state legislatures in making classifications and distinctions
in tax statutes. 12 0 Consequently, it is incredibly rare for a state tax
law to fall under equal protection alone. 12 ' By these standards, the
Arkansas legislature may defend the tax by claiming that, while the
113 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHi.
L. REV. 20 (1975). But see MichaelJ. Perry, Modern Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1076 (1979).
114 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
115 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per
curium); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
116

See Police Dep't of Chicago, 408 U.S. at 101.

117 The First Amendment "overriding interest test" ("necessary to achieve an overriding government interest") and equal protection strict scrutiny (necessary to a compelling governmental interest) appear linguistically identical. Both are mentioned and
apparently applied in Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582, 585.
118 All legislation or other government regulations containing a classification not
involving a suspect class or a fundamental right fall into this category. See Peter Weston,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV, 537, 569 (1982).
119
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
120 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (1991); see also cases cited supra note 12.
121 The Court did find a state tax in violation of the Equal Protection Clause based
on excessive variations in assessments of property values. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989). Allegheny was the first equal protection
violation by a state tax scheme under the rational basis test since Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
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tax decided to promote speech activities in newspapers and
magazines, the state could not afford to support similarly broadcast
media. Such logic is rational and easily surpasses an equal protection challenge.
Consequently, in practice, an equal protection challenge is indistinguishable from a First Amendment challenge, as the entire
case turns on the question of whether the statute infringes upon free
speech.
2.

Adding the FirstAmendment-the Needfor Intermediate Scrutiny

The majority in Medlock correctly noted that a tax of general
applicability levied against a large portion of the media reduces the
potential for government censorship. This was the basis of the Minneapolis Star decision.1 2 2 Professor Stone makes a similar point but
in a somewhat different context. In making a distinction between
viewpoint and subject matter restraints, he divides subject matter
into two categories. First, there is speech involving a narrow issue
or a narrow cluster of issues. 23 Stone views the regulation of such
narrowly focused speech as inherently more suspect, as it is likely to
disadvantage one side of the debate and serves more easily as a
means of covert government censorship. 124 Similarly, where a differential tax targets only the press or burdens only a small segment
of the press, the same potential for abuse exists. 125 On the other
hand, subject matter restrictions directed against broad classes of
speech raise far fewer problems of government abuse or distorting
impact.' 2 6 This characterization can apply to the tax at issue in
Medlock in the same way.
Even in this second category, Stone does not advocate a completely deferential standard of scrutiny. 12 7 The Court's approach in
Medlock suffers from the lack of more rigorous scrutiny. The absence of a possible government intent to control or restrict content
does not exhaust the possible infringement of First Amendment values. Even content neutral burdens on speech must surpass more
than a rational basis test.' 28 In fact, the Arkansas tax may affect the
Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933). See RobertJ. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 261 (1990).

122
123
124

460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
Stone, supra note 99, at 110.
Id

125 See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) (stating that a "tax on a
small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views.").
126 Stone, supra note 99, at 112.
127
Id. at 114.
128
Content neutral burdens are usually analyzed either as time, place, and manner
regulations or as incidental burdens on speech under the O'Brien framework. See infra
notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
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content of and access to cable programming, thus limiting the permissible quantity of speech.
C.

Intermediate Scrutiny
1. Differential Taxation as an Infringement of Free Speech

The First Amendment limits the government's ability to
"abridge" freedom of expression, but this broad term is not easily
defined. For example, the Minneapolis Star Court struck down a tax
system that actually benefited the press in comparision to other
businesses.1 29 Even if the Medlock test is not met and the danger of
censorship is minimal, a differential tax of the media still has the
potential to curtail free speech. As the dissent in Medlock points out,
cable offers a unique subject matter content to the "marketplace of
ideas."' 130 Cable presents original viewpoints, particularly through
its greater access to national information and opinion as compared
to the more local emphasis of many newspapers.' 3' Local politicians dispensing tax breaks no doubt feel more comfortable with
local newspapers, especially if their press coverage is usually
favorable.

13 2

129 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
596 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130 Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 1451 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For
the classic formulation of the marketplace of ideas concept, see Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market .. ");
see also THOMAS I. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8 (1963); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 627-28 (1986).

131 See M. Ethan Katsh, The FirstAmendment and Technological Change: The New Media
Have a Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1989). Much of the discussion about
the value of cable television has focused on opportunities for greater access to the airwaves by citizens via cable technology's abundance of channels. See infra note 164. The
most significant communicative impact of cable, however, comes not from greater access
for speakers, but from the greater choices provided to viewers. Cable offrs greater
viewer access to news (CNN), government proceedings (C-SPAN), cultural and entertainment programming (e.g., A&E network), and programming from "super-stations" in large national markets (e.g., WWOR from New York or WMBS from Atlanta).
This information, effectively available only through a cable subscription, has independent First Amendment significance. See 1989 BROADCASTING/CABLE Y.B. E-5;John E. Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 39 (1988);
Vernone Sparkes, Cable Television in the United States: A Story of Continuing Growth and
Change, in CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTING 1, 38 (Ralph M. Negrine
ed., 1985).
For criticism of the role of television in shaping (and distorting) public discourse in
America, see Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of
Paratroopers,68 TEX. L. REV. 1087 (1990). For an amusing and insightful criticism of the
Collins and Shaver article, pointing out the communicative value of television, see Mark
V. Tushnet, Decoding Television (and Law Reviews), 68 TEx. L. REV. 1179 (1990).
132 See Richard J. Tofel, Is Differential Taxation of Press Entities by States Constitutional?,
73 J. TAX'N 42, 44 (1990).
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Even if a differential tax does not affect the content of cable, it
diminishes the permissible quantity and effective exercise of speech.
The sales tax in Medlock distorts the market by pricing consumers
out of cable subscriptions in favor of alternative media with different
content such as newspapers or commercial television.13 3 The ma34
jority failed to recognize this likely effect.'
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to receive information and ideas as a necessary corollary to the right to
speak.13 5 In Boardof Education v. Pico, a plurality of the Court recognized a student's right of access to certain literature in a high school
library.' 3 6 This holding would be even more significant in a nonschool setting such as a ban on books from a general public library.
Although Medlock concerns the taxation rather than elimination of
cable, 13 7 the analysis is similar. The school board in Pico did not
forbid the students from using the banned books, but it did force
them to take the more expensive and less convenient route of acquiring the books from sources other than the school library. Similarly, after Medlock, potential customers may still acquire cable
television, but the tax imposes a differentially harsh burden on access to that medium. 138 In Red Lion Broadcastingv. FCC,'3 9 the Court
133
See BRUCE M. OwEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 31 (1975); see also Competition, Rate Deregulation, and
the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, 5
F.C.C.R. 4962, 4995 (1990) (discussing competition between and interchangeability of
cable television and rival media).
134 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered such a challenge in an intramedia
context but denied the claim, holding that an economic regulation not affecting the content of a publication does not implicate the First Amendment merely because it may
affect the number of readers of a newspaper. This decision failed to recognize the First
Amendment rights of a newspaper's readers (similar to cable television subscribers in
Medlock). Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir.)
(denying First Amendment challenge to the Newspaper Preservation Act, which created
an exception to the antitrust laws for joint operating agreements between large newspapers despite possible detriment to smaller newspapers in the market), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 892 (1983).
135 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-765 (1972); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305
(1965); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
136 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982).
137 For a case striking down a total ban on pay television, see Weaver v.Jordan, 411
P.2d 289 (Cal. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
138 Most economists agree that consumers bear the burden of retail sales taxes despite the fact that it is originally collected from merchants. Thus, while cable companies
pay the tax, at least some of it will be passed on to the customers. The actual degree to
which the customers bear the burden depends on the nature of supply and demand for
the product. See Edgar K. Browning, The Burden of Taxation, 86J. POL. ECON. 649, 658-59
(1978); Charles E. McClure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court:An Examination of
Four Casesfrom the 1980 Term, I Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 72 (1980).
139 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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recognized the customer right to receive information in the context
of commercial television: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 1 40 A
differential tax significantly restricts the use of cable, regardless of
any possible censorial motive by the legislature, thus burdening free
expression and implicating First Amendment values.
2. Judicial Scrutiny of the Medlock Infringement
After distinguishing Medlock from Minneapolis Star and Ragland,
the Supreme Court had three possible approaches by which it could
subject the differential tax to heightened scrutiny. The analysis in
the first approach is similar to the Court's analysis of time, manner,
and place restrictions of other First Amendment rights. 14 ' First,
both infringements are facially content neutral but present possible
adverse content effects. Second, they present differential taxation
burdens but do not prohibit the speech at issue, as time, manner, or
place restrictions do, presuming that alternative communication formats are available. 14 2 Third, taxation classifications and the use of a
public forum both raise the distinction between subsidization and
burden. 43 Time, manner, and place restrictions must be tailored
narrowly to serve a significant government interest. 14 4 In practice,
this test has resembled a flexible reasonableness standard of balancing. It is, however, a more sensitive test to the First Amendment
14 5
interests than a rational basis test.
One primary difference between differential taxation and other
content neutral restrictions on free expression is that the speech itself does not create a potential harm in the taxation case. Consequently, the government advances an interest independent of the
Id.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). For commentary on the Court's
standard of scrutiny for regulations limiting the use of public forums, see C. Edwin
Baker, UnreasonedReasonableness: Mandatory ParadePermits and Time, Place, and MannerRegulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (1983); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12; William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little
People, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrineof Time, Place, andManner Regulations of Expression,
54 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 757 (1986); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHi. L. REV. 46 (1987).
142
The Court's test requires that the regulation at issue "leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
143
For more on subsidization analysis, see discussion infra part III.C.3.b.
144
Hefron, 452 U.S. at 654.
145 See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980); see also Stone, supra note 98, at 190 (discussing the open-ending form of balancing used to test content neutral restrictions.).
140

141
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speech, making it more difficult to weigh. In addition, while the emphasis on the availability of alternative outlets for expression does
not clearly fit the differential tax question, it does show that First

Amendment interests may be infringed upon regardless of the presence of possible improper legislative motives.

The second approach to the use of heightened scrutiny in the
face of content neutral restrictions is illustrated in United States v.

O'Brien.146 O'Brien involved symbolic expression and the
speech/conduct distinction as applied to the burning of a draft card
in protest of the Vietnam war. 14 7 The O'Brien test has been widely

applied to general government regulations that incidentally burden
speech. The incidental restriction must serve a substantial government interest, be unrelated to free expression, and be no more re148
strictive than essential in furthering government interest.

Although the O'Brien test appears strict in form, the Court has often
applied it in a highly deferential manner.' 49 The lower courts, by
contrast, have applied O'Brien more forcefully, usually in the context
of a ban on a certain method of speech. 150 In any case, O'Brien does
raise scrutiny above rational basis and appears particularly appropriate for taxation schemes that burden speech incidentally and without regard to content.
146
147

391 U.S. 367 (1968).

Many Supreme Court opinions have distinguished between speech and conduct,
and have resisted extending full First Amendment protections to expressive conduct or
symbolic speech. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 616 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965);
see also John H. Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing
in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975) (arguing that the O'Brien
Court declined to rely on the speech/conduct distinction). The O'Brien Court, however,
recognized that regulations aimed at conduct may still restrict speech incidentally. 391
U.S. at 377. Content neutral regulations that incidentally burden speech are not limited
to the symbolic speech area, and also frequently arise concerning the appropriate First
Amendment use of various forums and media for communication. The Supreme Court
has recognized this fact and broadened the application of O'Brien beyond the context of
symbolic speech. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV.
148
149

615, 648-49 (1991).

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
Indeed, in O'Brien itself the Court sustained the restriction with little actual scrutiny of the government's interest weighed against the value of the respondent's speech.
See also Vincent, 466 U.S. at 789 (applying O'Brien test to uphold a city ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in
FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 127 (1981) ("[I]t is practically inconceivable that an asserted governmental purpose will not qualify.").
150 See, e.g., Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(partially protecting from antitrust laws concerted boycott with both political and commercial goals), rev'd, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835
F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating the FCC's requirement that cable systems carry
local broadcast signals).
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The third possible approach by which heightened scrutiny may
be applied to differential taxation of the press is through an equal
protection analysis. Equality animates the principles of Minneapolis
Star and Ragland-itis not taxation of the press alone that implicates
the First Amendment, but the application of discriminatory taxes.
Consequently, equal protection principles have inevitably influenced the analysis of such taxes. 1 5 1 As noted above, Minneapolis Star
applied strict scrutiny to differential taxation of the press because
the Court feared the likelihood of censorship. This mode of analysis
parallels that used in general equal protection challenges, requiring
a showing of illegitimate intent by the legislature as well as a disproportionate effect. 152 Minneapolis Star and Medlock take this conventional analysis one step further by presuming an intent to censor
when a differential tax meets certain criteria.15 3 When none of these
conditions is met, however, the level of review presumably falls to
rational basis. Equal protection analysis, by contrast, provides for
the possibility of intermediate scrutiny. Such intermediate scrutiny
requires that the government regulation at issue serve important
government objectives and be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. 154 The Court has also recognized that heightened scrutiny is appropriate when a state classification significantly
burdens a fundamental right.' 55 The wisdom of revising the traditional structure of two-tier equal protection analysis has generated
considerable debate.' 5 6 At present, the Craigintermediate scrutiny
151
See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987); Simon, supra
note 4, at 82-83; see also discussion supra part III.B (dicussing the role of equal protection
analysis in the Medlock decision).
152
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-66 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
153
The tax must lack general applicability, be based on content, or be applied to a
small number within a medium. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444-45 (1991).
154
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
155
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curium); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a law denying public
education to children not "legally admitted" into the United States).
156
Rigid two-tier equal protection review, with its chasm between fatal strict scrutiny and the deferential rational basis test, is too blunt an instrument to address complicated issues of discrimination in areas such as gender. The Court reacted by tinkering
with the old structure and adding an intermediate level of review. See Craig v. Bonon,
406 U.S. 164 (1972);Jeffrey H. Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" EqualProtection
Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 777
(1981). Critics of the Court's approach have either favored replacing the entire structure with a flexible balancing approach, see MassachusettsBd. of Retirement, 427 U.S. at 318
(Marshall, J., dissenting); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1973), or have
advocated putting more "bite" into rational basis review by requiring a closer fit between means and end, see Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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has not been applied to classifications other than gender' 57 and illegitimacy.' 58 It seems an unlikely precedent from which to argue for
more stringent review of differential taxation.
The language of the O'Brien test is similar to intermediate scrutiny under Craig. Both require a showing of a considerable government interest and the use of the least restrictive means to reach the
government's objective. Moreover, the Court has largely merged
the O'Brien test with its test of time, manner, and place restrictions. 159 Consequently, all three of these tests combine to form a
unified approach. This approach draws from equal protection the
focus on the differential nature of the tax as the problem. It then
uses First Amendment concepts to raise scrutiny above rational basis based on the speech-infringing effect of the tax, regardless of
possible censorial intent.
Reliance on equal protection to invalidate laws such as the one
at issue in Medlock raises another problem. The Court usually remedies such a violation by holding the differentiation unconstitutional,
but permits the legislature to equalize the effects of the law by restricting all speech within the identified group, rather than lifting
the tax on the disproportionately affected party. Justice Rehnquist
noted this in Minneapolis Star, pointing out that the legislature could
rectify the problem simply by subjecting all newspapers to a general
tax. 160 The net effect of this remedy is to curtail speech. Such a
rule, however, would have beneficial effects as well. It ends a distorting effect favoring some segments of the media and prevents
sectors of the press from being divided and weakened politically.
3.

State Interests in Defense of the Tax

In considering possible government interests, the state, in both
Minneapolis Star and Medlock, asserted the need to raise revenue.
Though this interest is substantial, 161 it fails to explain the need of
the government to tax segments of the media differently. In fact,
removing the exemption from newspapers, magazines, and commercial television better serves the goal of raising revenue. Instead,
two other possible justifications for the tax should be analyzed:
First, the special nature of a particular medium or member of the
press and, second, the choice to subsidize certain types of speech.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
159 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
160
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
602 (1983). For criticism of the use of equal protection analysis in First Amendment
cases, see Roy A. Black, Case Comment, Equal But InadequateProtection:A Look at Mosley
and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469 (1973).
161
Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
157
158
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a. Cable Television and the Broadcast Media
The Court should have considered the unique nature of cable
television and the extent to which constitutional restrictions regarding regulations of the print media apply to the broadcast media.
The Court in Medlock made it clear that a cable television operation
is engaged in "speech" under the First Amendment, as well as constituting part of the "press."' 6 2 Some unique aspects of the broadcast media, however, justify differential treatment in certain
circumstances. For example, television's greater power to intrude
into the home and relative ease of access to children may justify a
greater level of content restriction. 163 The limited access to broadcast media may support a requirement that equal time be provided
for those opposing the views of the station or the views of those
permitted to use the station. 64
As a result of Red Lion Broadcasting,a state could justify a greater
burden on cable television due to the unique nature of the medium;
for example, an extra charge for use of a public right-of-way. The
162 Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (1991) (citing Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)).
163
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
164 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
FCC's fairness doctrine); cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (striking down a state statute which required a newspaper to provide a free "right
of reply" to any candidate for public election criticized in the newspaper regarding his
personal character or official record).
The regulations requiring access to cable, such as through local cable-access stations, have generated a considerable body of scholarly commentary. See Daniel Brenner,
Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE L.J. 329 (advocating flexible, ad
hoc review of cable regulations, stressing the importance of access requirements given
the large channel capability of cable); Robert A. Kreiss, Deregulationof Cable Television and
the Problem ofAccess Under the FirstAmendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1981) (arguing that
government must of necessity determine who may speak on cable-abundance of channels leads to affirmative duty to create access); Mark Mininberg, Circumstances Within Our
Control. Promoting Freedom of Expression Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
551 (1984) (treating cable as a public forum with reasonable access to the public); Christine Gasser, Note, Cable Television: A New Challengefor the "Old" FirstAmendment, 60 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 114 (1985) (arguing that First Amendment rights of cable should be
drawn with reference to print media, giving precedence to the cable operator's right to
speak while still recognizing that the unique nature of a medium may justify some regulations); Alison Melnick, Comment, Access to Cable Television: A Critique of the Affirmative
Duty Theory of the FirstAmendment, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1982) (arguing that affirmative
duty has not provided the intended diverse programming; instead, it has furnished regulators with a potential means of censorship and harassment).
In addition, note that newspapers, while not physically scarce in the same sense as
broadcasting media, do have many characteristics of a natural monopoly, leading to a
proliferation of one-newspaper towns. See POSNER, supra note 130, at 634-35; James N.
Rosse, Daily Newspapers, Monopolistic Competition, and Economies of Scale, 57 AM. ECON. REV.,
Papers and Proceeding,No. 2, at 522 (May 1967). Congress passed the Newspaper Preservation Act to permit joint operating agreements between newspapers where one newspaper was failing and the papers retained independent editorial and reporting staffs. See
infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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state may also reasonably choose not to tax small publications or
broadcasters, a "fledgling publisher exception" alluded to in
Ragland.165 The Ragland Court considered the state's interests in
not taxing small publications, such as an interest in keeping them
afloat or avoiding the unjustified expense of levying taxes on their
small revenues. 166 While the Court did not specifically endorse
these interests as either compelling or important, it rejected them in
Ragland only because the statute was not narrowly tailored to
achieve this end. 167 Such interests could explain the Hearst Corp.
case,16 8 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the Newspaper Preservation Act,169 which provided an antitrust exemption for joint operating arrangements among newspapers when necessary to save a
financially ailing publication. Hence, when a publication will fail
without state subsidies, a special tax break to benefit that publication may better serve the ends of the First Amendment and pass
heightened scrutiny.
A medium may also present unique administrative difficulties in
the collection of a tax. For example, a state may resist placing a
sales tax on newspapers because of the difficulty of collecting the tax
from door-to-door delivery agents or vending machines.' 70 The administrative ease of a government regulation or tax may well serve a
sufficiently important interest when weighed against the incidental
infringement of speech.171
b. Government Subsidization of Speech
Another possible defense for differential taxation is the government's interest in subsidizing some, but not all, speech.' 72 This is
165
166

Ragland, 481 U.S. at 232.
Id

167

Id

168 Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
169 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1988).
170 See Dow Jones & Co. v. Oklahoma ev rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843, 847

(Okla. 1990).
171
Compare FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990)
(holding the administrative efficiency interest in an antitrust per se rule sufficient to outweigh any incidental effect on the expressive content of a concerted boycott) with Dow
Jones & Co., 787 P.2d at 847 (holding that efficient tax collection is not an interest distinct from that in raising revenue and does not justify differential intermedia taxation).
172
Government can take an active role in the First Amendment in one of two ways:
either by speaking directly, as through education, or by subsidizing private actors to
speak in its place. The Court has long rejected the power of government to use its
subsidies to deter unrelated speech under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). However, government can selectively subsidize
speech activities without challenge from those not subsidized. See Rust v. Sullivan, I I I
S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). There
is a subtle distinction between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and subsidiza-
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the fundamental tension between TWR and Minneapolis Star.17 3 The
statute at issue in Minneapolis Star was struck down because it permitted possible abuse in the form of the censorship of independent
views by the press. Yet, as Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent, the
Minneapolis Star holding ignores the ability of a legislature to subsidize the press, or certain subgroups of it, in furtherance of First
Amendment values. 174 Under TWR, a state has the discretion to
subsidize any speech it chooses, using any criteria including content.
Those whose speech the government decides not to support have
no cognizable constitutional claim. 175 The essential principle behind subsidization cases is that "although government may not
place obstacles in the path of the exercise of a constitutionally protected activity, it need not remove obstacles not of its own
76
creation."1
The problem with the Medlock Court's reliance on TWR is that
TWR cannot possibly mean that government is free to subsidize
speech on any basis whatsoever. Prior precedents have in fact limited government's discretion to "remove obstacles" to speech selectively. First, Minneapolis Star rejected the differential use of subsidies
for the press. The tax at issue in that case operated to subsidize
both the press in general and to further benefit small newspapers.
The Court, however, had no difficulty subjecting the tax to strict
scrutiny and finding it in violation of the First Amendment. The
Court has also limited government's power to subsidize selectively
tion doctrine based on the relation of the benefit withheld to the right the person seeks
to exercise. Subsidization permits the government to deny direct support for the exercise of a constitutional right, while the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents
government from withholding unrelated benefits as a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right. For example, in the abortion context, government may refuse to fund
abortions, but it probably may not deny all welfare benefits to a woman who exercises
her right to have an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).
The problem of how to limit the possible distorting or coercive impact of selective
government speech, while still recognizing the legitimate need for government to speak
and to support speech, has generated considerable commentary. See Theodore C. Hirt,
Why the Government Is Not Requiredto Subsidize Abortion Counselingand Referral, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1895 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in
a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27
UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the UnconstitutionalConditions DoctrineIs
an Anachronism (With ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV.
593 (1990); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863 (1979); Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as "Nonsubsidies" When is Deference Inappropriate?,80 GEo. L.J. 131
(1991).
173
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
174
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
602 (1983).
175 461 U.S. at 548-49.
176
Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473,
479 (Ist Cir. 1989) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
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in analogous free exercise cases. 177 For example, in BobJones University v. United States, 178 the Court denied a free exercise challenge to
the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
schools. The Court denied this challenge only after applying an
"overriding interest" test, finding the government's interest compelling and the means used to promote that interest to be the least
restrictive possible. 179 Consequently, when government makes subsidization choices on the basis of viewpoint (or religious belief), the
Court often limits government discretion and requires that selective
subsidization meet the appropriate level of constitutional
scrutiny.'18 0
Second, the Court often limits the discretion of government to
choose who may use its facilities for speech purposes. Every public
forum case in which government denies access on the basis of content can be considered as a subsidization question.' 8 ' However, the
Court usually has no difficulty disposing of such cases under strict
177 The Court has typically used the same standards and level of scrutiny in free
exercise cases as in general free speech claims under the First Amendment. See Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (upholding the imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials, relying on taxation of the press precedents Minneapolis Star and Ragland). Compare
Swaggart with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), where the Court invalidated a flat license tax on door-to-door solicitation as applied to the distribution of religious literature. See also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT.
REV. 1 (arguing that the independent stature of the Free Exercise Clause demands that
government take pains to avoid incidental interference with religious expression, including refraining from the application of general taxes and regulations).
178 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983).
179 Id. at 604. But see Elliot M. Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation With Representation of Washington, Mueller, and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REv.
275 (arguing that the government interest in eliminating private discrimination not sufficiently compelling to justify a content restraint on Bob Jones University's religious
speech).

180
172.

See Student Gov't Ass'n, 868 F.2d at 482; Shiffrin, supra note 172; Yudof, supra note

181 While a public forum analytically represents a question of subsidization through
government resources and facilities, courts usually treat public forum cases as an exception to subsidization analysis. See Student Gov't Ass'n, 868 F.2d at 480.
The Court has long implied a First Amendment right of access to traditional public
forums such as streets and parks. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
[S]treets and parks ... have immorially been held in trust for use of the
public ...

for purposes of [speech] ....

The privilege ...

to use the

streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may
be regulated in the interest of all ... it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486
U.S. 750, 777 (1988) (White,J., dissenting); Airport Comm'rs v.Jews forJesus, Inc., 482
U.S. 569, 572-73 (1987); Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
On the other hand, the Court has more willingly denied access to nontraditional
public forums, based either on a categorization or compatibility approach, and permit-
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scrutiny. For example, in Healy v. James,I8 2 a state university denied
official recognition to a student organization because of its radical
views and possible disruptive activities.' 8 3 Without recognition, the
organization could not announce its activities in the school newspaper or on campus bulletin boards, nor could it use campus facilities
for meetings.18 4 The school argued that since the students in the
organization could still meet and engage in First Amendment activities off campus, they only were denied the university's support and
approval and not their First Amendment rights.' 8 5 The Court rejected this argument, finding it sufficient that the university had burdened the students' speech rights based on the content of their
views. 186
Additionally, the logic of Minneapolis Star dictates that a subsidy
has at least as great a potential for censorial abuse as does the direct
imposition of a burden on the press. Once a legislature subjects a
medium to a general tax, the state loses any potential leverage with
respect to that medium. Any change in the taxes on the medium
must similarly affect all other businesses also subject to the tax. By
granting a tax subsidy, however, the state can breed financial dependence on the medium if the state retains the discretion to remove
the subsidy. The Arkansas legislature retained this discretion and
ting restrictions if reasonable. SeeJewsforJesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 569; Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-03 (1974).
For literature on public forum analysis, see Ronald A. Cass, FirstAmendment Access to
Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The
MisleadingNature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication,
70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Robert C. Post, Between Governanceand Management. The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Richard B. Saphire,
Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1991); Barbara S. Gaal,
Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35
STAN. L. REV. 121 (1982).
A significant strand in those cases concerning non-traditional forums is the equation of government control over its facilities with that of a private property owner. See
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) ("The State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."). The Court does not explain why, other than tradition, streets and
parks are held to a different standard. In any case, such a view of public forums adds
support to a subsidy analysis. In fact, some members of the Court, notably Justice White,
have recently applied subsidization analysis to public forums. See Lakewood, 486 U.S. at
780 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]hose seeking to distribute materials protected by the
First Amendment do not have a right to appropriate public property merely because it
best facilitates their efforts. 'We again reject the "notion that First Amendment rights
are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State .... .)(quoting
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (quoting Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring))).
182
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
183
Id. at 175-76.
184
Id. at 181.
185
Id. at 182-83.
186
Id. at 183.
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removed the cable television companies' exemption in 1987.187
Consequently, in Medlock, the continuing danger of censorial abuses
exists not for the cable television operators who now pay a general
tax, but rather for the exempted newspapers, magazines, and commercial television stations.
Most cases similar to TWR consider the subsidy issue as part of
the infringement inquiry. If government chooses to subsidize only
certain speech, those speakers excluded may not claim that their
First Amendment rights are thereby burdened. The abortion subsidy cases are a good example of this approach. t8 8 In Rust v. Sullivan, t89 the Court upheld a federal regulation prohibiting family
planning clinics from receiving federal funds if they offered abortion
counseling or referral services. The Court did not attach significance to the content-discriminating intent of the law, which was
designed to suppress an idea the legislature considered dangerous.
Nor did the Court consider the denial of a pregnant woman's right
to receive information as part of the First Amendment analysis.' 90
The Court, however, does not consistently follow this approach. It still has found potential infringement of speech or free
exercise rights in cases like Healy, MinneapolisStar, and BobJones University. Where subsidization can be used to control the content of
expression and suppress disfavored viewpoints, the Court has more
readily ignored the subsidy question. However, some distinctions
on the basis of content are inevitable when government subsidizes
speech. The Court in TWR gave the example of a legislature directing public money to'combat teenage alcohol abuse.'t9 Certainly, government may impose content limits with such speech
regarding both subject matter and viewpoint. Indeed, vigorous
competition between programs for grants necessitates that government, with its limited funds, must make choices based on content.
Similarly, the state, when subsidizing the arts, must make decisions
19 2
based on artistic value, which invariably require judging content.
Consequently, merely identifying an issue as one concerning subsiSee supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
For the Court's approach in earlier abortion funding cases, see Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which denied federal Medicaid
funding for all abortions, even those necessary to save the mother's life); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a state regulation providing
Medicaid payments for medical expenses necessary for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions).
189 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
190 See Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulationof Abortion Information
and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916 (1988).
191 461 U.S. at 548-49.
192
Sunstein, supra note 172, at 611.
187
188
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dization, as in TWR or Medlock, does not begin to address the complicated questions of legislative choice involved.
The Court could avoid this inconsistency by analyzing the subsidy question as a matter of government interest under the appropriate level of scrutiny. The Court should weigh the extent and
significance of the burden on speech, the presence or absence of
possible censorship or content effect, and the strength and legitimacy of the government's interest in selectively supporting the
speech at issue. Where government subsidies provide possible leverage to control content, strict scrutiny under the model of Minneapolis Star should be used. Even in the absence of such a subsidy, as in
Medlock, an incidental burden on speech should require intermediate scrutiny as in O'Brien.
4.

The Weighing Process and the Press Clause

The method by which speech is subsidized is relevant to this
inquiry. TWR and Medlock considered tax deductions and exemptions as equivalent to cash payments. 193 Indeed, both necessitate
consideration of the problem of scarce government resources. Because the state cannot afford to support all speech activities, it must
distinguish, on some basis, the speech it choses to subsidize.1 94 The
degree of infringement in a case like Medlock is not extreme because
the tax only increases the cost of access, rather than foreclosing it
completely. Confronted with this moderate, but real, infringement,
the State in Medlock offered no persuasive reason for taxing cable
television while not taxing newspapers, magazines, or commercial
television. Nor did the subsidized media provide speech services
systemically different or superior to cable television. Nor did the
State show administrative difficulty in taxing newspapers,
magazines, and commercial television. In addition, the State did not
prove that the exempted media were experiencing financial difficulties which would account for the difference. Thus, the facts of
Medlock did not justify the state's differential taxation, even if considered a matter of subsidization. In any case, the question is far closer
than the Court recognized.
Finally, the vital role of the media, as provider of information
and criticism under the First Amendment, should be recognized in
193 461 U.S. at 549 (citing Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (tax
exemptions and deductions are "a matter of grace... [that] Congress can, of course,
disallow.., as it chooses.")). Sullivan, however, did not concern the effect of withholding a tax exemption on the exercise of a fundamental right.
194
Public forums probably represent a case where no severe resource expense is
involved in providing access for speech to all, but even here speech must be restricted to
reasonable times and manners, and no government could afford constant use of its public forums for demonstrations, marches and the like.
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the weighing process. The press, as a whole, plays a unique role in
informing the public, unmatched by any other First Amendment activity. First Amendment analysis, and much of this Note, treats freedom of speech and freedom of the press as synonymous, and in
most cases the relevant interests involved do not diverge. 19 5 The
constitutional text, however, assigns to the press an independent
role as an institution. Its special status is invoked when government
19 6 Some
regulations distinctly harm its news-gathering capability.
commentators characterize the Press Clause as creating an independent check on government, almost a fourth branch in the con197
stitutional framework.
Furthermore, questions of media access are distinct from typical individual speech claims because, through the media, access is
potentially afforded to all. This is the unique nature and special role
of the press comprehended by the First Amendment and enhanced
by the evolution of modern technology. Because of the widespread
use of mass media for information, a differential tax has a far greater
potential to distort access to speech. When a tax structure distinctly
affects the media, the Minneapolis Star Court recognized the significant danger to values protected by the Press Clause. 198 The same
principles apply to the tax in Medlock because its differential nature
also uniquely affects the press.
CONCLUSION

In Medlock, the Court successfully ended some of the uncertainty and fear of an expansive sweep following Minneapolis Star and
See Anderson, supra note 10, at 458-59.
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (right of
access to courtrooms); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (right to keep
police from searching newsrooms); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (right of access to prisons); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (right to maintain confidentiality of sources).
197 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521; Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of the Press a Redundancy: What
Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Nowak, supra note 131;
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
The debate about whether the Press Clause adds any special protections for, or
burdens on, the press has also generated considerable commentary to the contrary. See
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see
also Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFsTRA L. REV. 595 (1979)
(arguing that special press protection would exacerbate journalistic arrogance and create a press-centered jurisprudence that would overshadow equally deserving claims for
individual freedoms); William V. Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred
Position", 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977) (concerned that a press preferrence would also
bring additional regulation of the press on the grounds that it acts in trust for the public). This view has generally prevailed in the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the fact
that the press lost all the cases listed supra note 181.
198
460 U.S. at 585; see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
195

196
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Ragland. Unfortunately, the Court ended its analysis one step too
soon. The power of government to use taxes to distort speech is
not limited to censorship motives, for the First Amendment also
subjects content neutral restrictions to close judicial scrutiny. Two
constitutional problems plague a differential tax even after it survives the Medlock test: First, the continuing state leverage over the
entities receiving subsidies under the differential tax, and second,
the possible distortion of speech for those seeking access to cable
television.
Medlock relied on the general principle that government has no
First Amendment obligation to subsidize a person's speech, even if
government chooses to do so selectively. This sharp line between
subsidies and burdens fails to comport with the realities of the
Court's past analysis or with the requirements of the First Amendment. Traditional distinctions, such as that between content neutral
and content discriminatory regulations, are difficult to make when
government takes an active role in the First Amendment process.
Instead, a balancing approach that considers the government's discretion to subsidize as a legitimate interest to be weighed against its
distorting effect on speech, will provide a more consistent speech
protective analysis in this area.
This balance should also consider two additional facts. First, as
an institution, the press plays a central role in criticizing the government and informing the public. While few suggest that the Press
Clause creates immunity for the media from all taxes and regulations, the inherent First Amendment values require that such regulations be applied in the least discriminatory manner possible.
Second, there is even less reason to accord state tax classifications
their usual deference when the press is involved. In most cases, the
dispensing or withholding of tax benefits concerns little more than
the property of the tax payer and indirect economic management by
the legislature. However, the institutional press represents a point
at which the division between personal and property rights dissolves. The press constitutes profit-making entities in the business
of free speech. The Minneapolis Star case took a step toward recognizing the special institutional role of the press in this unique situation. In Medlock, however, the Supreme Court beat a hasty and illadvised retreat.
Benjamin Lombard

